While still at the top of the GP growth table, the Chinese economy seems
 to be on a long-term traverse from a trajectory with extremely high 
growth rates to one where growth is more moderate. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Chinese GDP growth, year-on-year, 
which had fallen from 8.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2012, to 7.6 
per cent in the second and 7.4 per cent in the third quarter, had 
bounced back to 7.9 per cent in the last quarter of that year. But the 
good news may not be this sign of revival, but rather that GDP growth 
rates in China seem to be in long-term decline. As Chart 1 shows, growth
 spiked in China when the government launched a $585 billion stimulus 
package in response to the 2008 crisis, which drove the year-on-year 
quarterly growth rate from 6.6 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 to 
12.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2010. An important source of that 
acceleration in GDP growth was a spike in debt-financed construction 
activity at the provincial level, facilitated by an easy credit policy 
encouraged by the government.
The deceleration in growth began when the government decided that the 
rise in growth rates had gone too far. In a two step process starting in
 the second quarter of 2010, year-on-year quarterly growth rates have 
fallen from 12.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2012 to below 10 per 
cent between quarters ending September 2010 and September 2011, below 9 
per cent in the subsequent two quarters and below 8 per cent in the last
 three quarters of 2012. China's annual rate of GDP growth of 7.8 per 
cent in 2012 was also among the lowest it had registered in 13 years.
One reason why slowing growth seems positive in China's case is because 
high rates of growth were seen as being associated with overheating, 
reflected in a combination of bouts of consumer price inflation and a 
housing price bubble. Periodically the government had to rein in demand 
through administrative measures that curbed bank lending and investment 
expenditures by public sector corporations. However, the problem being 
structural, and linked to investment decision-making and financing in 
China, recurred once central government surveillance was relaxed, 
necessitating another round of administrative intervention. The long 
term slow down may be indicative of the beginnings of successful 
structural adjustment to address the problem.
An indication that this transformation is underway is partly provided by
 data showing that the importance of investment in driving GDP growth
 has been declining while the role of consumption has been increasing. 
With investment contributing more than 50 per cent of GDP in recent 
times, China had emerged as the classic instance of an economy with 
excess investment, where investment was not induced by perceived market 
demand and not demand constrained to the same degree as in a 
conventional capitalist economy. According to the Financial Times 
(October 18, 2012) "The ghost cities, empty apartment buildings and 
unused convention centres that dot the country are the physical 
manifestations of this excessive investment, and investors remain 
concerned that much of it will translate into bad debts for the banking 
sector."
 
Now there is evidence of a shift from investment to consumption. Data 
from the NBS indicate that during 2011 and 2012 consumption expenditure 
contributed 56 per cent 52 per cent of growth respectively, while 
investment contributed 49 and 50 per cent. The global recession had 
resulted in a negative contribution of 4 and 3 per cent from net 
exports. These figures compare with an 88 per cent contribution of 
investment, 50 per cent of consumption and a negative 37 per cent from 
net exports in 2009. The Chinese government that has been making a 
strong case for “rebalancing” growth welcomes this shift to consumption 
as the principal stimulus to growth.
Evidence suggesting that this trajectory was unsustainable was also 
coming from the financial sector with incomplete data pointing to a 
major role for credit from China's version of the "shadow banking" 
sector in financing a investment, housing and construction boom. Shadow 
finance varies from credit from loan sharks to small and medium 
businesses to investments in real estate and "prestige projects" of 
provincial governments with funds mobilized through financial trusts and
 wealth management products marketed by banks to rich investors. Since 
these investments promise high returns the projects involved are risky 
and unlikely to yield promised returns. The resulting instances of 
financial failure is forcing the government to rein in this activity as 
well, since estimates of the volume of investments made with “shadow 
finance” vary from 25 to 50 per cent of GDP. With regulation turning 
stricter, a slowdown of investment and growth is inevitable.
The reversal of the trajectory of high growth driven by excess 
investment has another positive side to it. According to figures on 
inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient which varies from 0, 
reflecting a situation of complete equality, and 1, or extreme 
inequality, with just one person in the population having all the 
income) released by the Chinese government for the first time (Chart 2),
 inequality rose when growth was high and fell when it slowed. This may 
be because measures to reduce inequality divert resources away from 
investment or because reduced inequality favours consumption over 
investment. In either case the outcome implies significant welfare 
gains.
According to an article in the online edition of the People’s Daily, 
“China's first release of the Gini coefficient for the past decade 
demonstrated the government’s resolve to bridge the gap between the rich
 and poor.” Though, the Gini has been falling, it is at 0.474, well 
above the red line of 0.4 set by the United Nations. According to Ma 
Jiantang, director of the NBS: "The statistics highlighted the urgency 
for our country to speed up the income distribution reforms to narrow 
the wealth gap." If that happens consumption may rise and growth slow 
further. But China’s new leadership seems to think that is the way to 
go. Slower growth may be upsetting the Indian government, but it seems 
to be a sign of achievement In China.